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Introduction
In the first years of Transformation, three papers dealt with intersecting rural
questions: Makhosazane Gcabashe and Alan Mabin’s ‘Preparing to negotiate
the land question’ (Transformation 11), Tom Bennett’s  ‘Human rights and
the African cultural tradition’ (Transformation 22) and Henry Bernstein’s
‘Food security in a democratic South Africa’ (Transformation 24). These
three papers all ask, from different vantage points, what the future of land,
food and agriculture will be in a new, liberated South Africa. They deal with
the thinking behind moves in the early 1990s towards enshrining land and
customary rights in law; towards agricultural deregulation; and towards the
redistribution of commercial farmland. Reading them collectively, they
suggest a variety of land questions and point out that agrarian change is not
all about land.
Bennett (1993) grapples with the contradiction between human rights
frameworks, with their universalising logic, and tendencies towards cultural
relativism. His concern is to expose the tensions underpinning debates at the
time, in the context of political transition, about the place of customary law
and traditional authority in a constitutional democracy. He explores the
possible implications of a proposed gender equality clause in the Constitution
and how this might be reconciled in law and practice with a future for
customary laws, practices and institutions.
Bernstein (1994) presents a perspective that weaves together issues of
land, food and agriculture – which was unusual at the time, when these policy
debates were highly segmented, taking place is disparate fora and involving
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different networks of actors. He bases his piece on Sen’s (1981) view that
adequate and secure ‘entitlements’ are preconditions for ‘food security’,
which cannot be assured through increased aggregate production. It doesn’t
help to say that poverty causes hunger – the essentially tautological
message of the World Bank – and so to wait for a generalised increase in
affluence. Rather, hunger arises from a loss of entitlements. This suggests
that rural food security should involve securing entitlements to land and
other resources, as well as restructuring agricultural markets.
Gcabashe and Mabin (1990) ask the profound question of ‘what it would
mean to end apartheid in rural South Africa’. They note that, like the
transition itself, the land issue would likely not see an ‘abrupt disjuncture’.
Their paper provides a useful delineation of key dimensions of land and
agrarian debates at the time – with the exception of the question of restoring
lost rights, or providing a ‘right to return’, through restitution. Historical
land claims and a wider initiative towards redistribution were not clearly
distinct at the time; indeed, the emergence of restitution as a discrete
programme (and with its own law, policy framework and implementing
institution) emerged in the context of the failure of radical options for
redistributive reform in the early 1990s. They urge substantial research to
support the development of policy options, and warn against economic
reductionism in dealing with land and agrarian issues.
This article explores these three articles from the perspective of 2011,
focusing on four themes: the politics of negotiations; the location of ‘rights’
in land and to custom; the political economy of agrarian change; and the
multiple facets of the ‘land question’. In conclusion, it draws attention to
enduring questions about how to confront agrarian dualism, dynamics of
changing and deepening inequality in the countryside, tensions between
the logic underpinning land and agricultural policies, and the need to recast
agrarian change in a wider frame, in recognition of the profound ways in
which what happens in South Africa’s rural areas are part of regional and
global dynamics.
Negotiating the land question
Gcabashe and Mabin, writing in 1990, expressed the realistic concern that ‘ill-
prepared participants in negotiations can witness results – even agreements
– which may contradict their intentions’ (1990:60). Yet in hindsight, I am not
convinced that ill-preparedness explains the African National Congress’
(ANC) position and eventual compromise around property rights in
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negotiations, either in 1993 at the Convention for a Democratic South Africa
(CODESA) or in the debates at the Constitutional Assembly in 1995 leading
up to the adoption of the final constitution in 1996. Indeed, most parties were
poorly prepared on matters of both land and agriculture as the era of
negotiations commenced. Gcabashe and Mabin correctly note the
significance of the emerging field of policy studies, and identify the various
institutes and think tanks backing up negotiators.
First, they discuss the mainstream economists: those associated with the
Development Bank of Southern Africa and the University of Pretoria who
were concerned with commercial agriculture and who envisaged and advocated
the expansion of approaches to commercialisation of ‘black agriculture’
piloted since the late 1980s in their own experiments with farmer support
programmes in the Bantustans. These actors would later author a new pro-
capitalist land reform policy, ‘Land Redistribution for Agricultural
Development’ and, in alliance with the National African Farmers’ Union,
exert substantial influence over both land and agricultural policy under
Mbeki, as key actors in his Presidential Working Group on Agriculture.
Second, they observe that ‘the left’ was rather thin on the ground, with
little technical capacity in the areas of land and agriculture with which to
galvanise information and analysis – recognition of which was part of the
motivation for the establishment in 1995 of the Programme for Land and
Agrarian Studies (PLAAS, now the Institute for Poverty, Land and Agrarian
Studies) at the University of the Western Cape. They characterise the
intellectual factions ranged around these policy debates within the ‘agrarian
left’ as including Marxist academics and non-governmental organisation
activists, many of whom went on to constitute the formidable team that
worked with the Land and Agriculture Policy Centre (LAPC), and some of
whom became the new bureaucrats of the Department of Land Affairs after
1994. To Gcabashe and Mabin’s cast of characters, though, I would add that,
by the end of the 1980s, there were networks between key thinkers inside and
outside the country. A small group of ANC exiles formed an informal reading
group based in Lusaka, but working with those elsewhere, and with local
activists and scholars – a network of several key figures who later, on return
from exile, established the ANC Land Commission and led its work of
generating policy informed by research and analysis.
Deficiencies in ‘the left’s’ policy proposals is not sufficient explanation
for what happened; in fact, key elements of the compromise around property
rights predated the CODESA discussion. In the period these three articles
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appeared in Transformation, the discourse of nationalisation lived on in
political rhetoric, but had always been the subject of contestation within the
ANC, and had been abandoned in its own proposals for a new dispensation
several years before. The rather moderate ANC Constitutional Guidelines
from 1989, adopted in Harare, envisaged a mixed agrarian economy comprised
of ‘a public sector, a private sector, a cooperative sector and a small-scale
family sector’ (ANC 1989: 132). The Guidelines implied that corporate and
commercial property may be subject to public regulation and committed a
future ANC-led government to:
i) Abolition of all racial restrictions on ownership and use of land;
ii) Implementation of land reforms in conformity with the principle of
Affirmative Action, taking into account the status of the victims of forced
removals. (ANC 1989: 132)
Rights for the propertied and the propertyless
The 1995 Constitutional Assembly process saw disagreement about whether
to have a property clause. ANC lawyers paved the way for the concession
that property rights would be constitutionally protected, with the aim of
using this clause to entrench land reform and natural resource transformation
– in other words, to balance the property rights of property owners and those
of the dispossessed. As explained by Geoff Budlender, a key legal advisor
at the time, the constitutional entrenchment of property rights in a Bill of
Rights would create ‘a constitutional package [which] would place the
landless and homeless in the position where they could make a claim of right
rather than a petition for largesse’ (Budlender 1992: 299, 203).
South Africa developed a lawyer-dominated land reform framework,
underpinned by strong presumptions about the ability of the law to change
society. This gave way, in less than a decade, to widespread scepticism
about a ‘rights-based approach’ to development. Now the question of the
application of rights, with which Bennett was concerned, is perhaps less
pressing than the question of the relationship between rights (as enshrined
in law) and social and economic change. We have a justiciable bill of rights,
but the ability to use this to change society has proved limited, provoking
questions about the role of the law in changing society, and the degree to
which a ‘rights’ framework provides adequate avenues to challenge power
and institutions.
While some emphasise the role of politics in constraining the realising of
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rights, others argue that changes in livelihoods and locality mean that land
does not occupy the centrally important economic role it once did (Walker
2006). These wider, non-programmatic, constraints on land reform have
since been amply itemised by Walker (2008), who talks of a ‘master narrative
of loss and restoration’, which elides the transformations wrought in land
and in family and community and economy after dispossession – and the
impossibility of a simple ‘turning back the clock’. Land represents not only
a means of production, but is constitutive of identity: which is why the
debates on land reform – its significance, how it should be done and who it
should be for – so often involve people talking at cross purposes, invoking
competing paradigms of economic efficiency and rights.
From ‘cultural rights’ to ‘living customary law’
Bennett is concerned with the blanket application of ‘rights’ in a context of
cultural diversity, noting that: ‘Most propagandists of the rights culture
would, in their more reflective moments, concede that human rights cannot
be successfully implemented without some regard being paid to local
conditions’. Bennett pointed out that ‘The ANC says nothing about cultural
rights’ but is also sceptical about the articulation of ‘African culture’ as a
distinctive tradition: ‘Safely distant from any possibility of empirical
verification, this primordial state has taken on a utopian quality’ (1993:31).
At the same time, Bennett talks about culture being reclaimed by ‘Africans’
from the domain of western scholarship, and being ‘rehabilitated’, an
intriguing choice of word, since it suggests both revival and reform. He was
writing of course in the context of the early 1990s CODESA negotiations;
here, in the context of attempts by the National Party and others towards
securing a minority veto, ‘group rights’ was code for resistance to
democratisation, and the entrenchment of vested interests. Ultimately, our
fudging of the issue of how the right to culture is to be reconciled with
universal rights has allowed the continuation of patriarchal institutions –
even though society might be transforming them gradually.
Bennett points to the ways in which family, kinship and lineage were
undergoing profound transformations wrought through demographic change
and migration. Research since, by Aninka Claassens and Sindiso Mnisi
(2009) among others, shows how a marked decline in marriage, increased
female urban migration, generational succession, HIV/Aids, social grants,
have resulted in changes in household formation, notably the emergence of
single woman-headed households with children and other dependants as
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the dominant household form in communal areas. Although in uneven,
gradual and ambiguous ways, this in turn has prompted shifts in ‘tradition’
– such as the documented increase in allocation of land by chiefs to
unmarried women with children (Claassens and Mnisi 2009). Bennett’s
(2008) later work draws attention to this growing dilemma regarding the gap
between ‘official’ customary law, as codified in statute, and ‘living’ customary
law as differentially practised through re-constituting and embedding social
relations.
The Nhlapo Commission on African Customary Law has encountered
precisely such tensions – for instance in a claim from within the Shangaan
royal family which challenged the tradition that women could not inherit the
chieftaincy. In this case the Commission ruled that the principles regarding
inheritance of this role, if consistent with the principle of gender equality,
would allow women to become chiefs, showing how constitutional rights can
co-exist with, but also transform, traditional institutions. This is in contrast
to the Traditional Courts Bill of  2009, which proposed to entrench the
legislative, executive and judicial functions of traditional authorities, without
provision for recourse to institutions available to other citizens. In the areas
of property law, succession and the status of women and children, important
strides have been made in law – even if not in practice – such as through the
Recognition of African Customary Marriages Act (120 of 1999). While
important strides have been made in law and in jurisprudence, much more
modest headway has been made in enforcing these laws, and addressing the
deeply-ingrained structural and institutional obstacles to transformation.
The political economy of agrarian change
The articles deal with the current and projected politics of ownership,
production, distribution and accumulation, and therefore not only questions
of land but of agrarian change, power and control in the food system as a
whole. In this context, Bernstein’s use of Sen’s framing helps us to identify
several of the important ways in which this terrain has shifted, largely in
ways antithetical to the approach he proposes:
Sen’s conception of development proposes the protection (or
restoration) of the entitlements of the most vulnerable and insecure
groups as an immediate amelioration measure, and the promotion of
adequate and secure entitlements for all as the strategic objective.
(1994:5)
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Losing entitlements
A striking example of a loss of entitlement over the past decade and a half
is the large-scale loss of livelihood resources among farm workers, as the
commercial farming sector restructured in response to market deregulation,
trade liberalisation, and the introduction of labour and tenure regulation.
Tenure reform (on farms, in communal areas, and to a degree also in informal
peri-urban settings) has been the poor relation of land reform. The astonishing
result is that, as a national evictions survey showed, between 1994 and 2003
(in the first decade of democracy), more black South Africans had lost their
tenuous hold on land on commercial farms through eviction than had
expanded and secured land access through redistribution and restitution –
and farm workers did not feature significantly among those getting land
(Wegerif et al 2005). Those evicted lost not only their jobs and homes, but
also livestock, access to cropping fields and standing crops, vegetable
gardens, household furniture and implements – and found themselves
unable to access free water and firewood.
Value chains: a ‘filieres vivries’ perspective
Restructuring has implications beyond employment, to the control of the
food system as a whole, and the patterns of capital accumulation and food
(in)security it produced. Bernstein notes the importance of analysing
ownership and control of food commodity chains ‘from farmers’ field to
consumer’s plate’. Over the past few years, the Competition Commission has
initiated investigations into many of the major agricultural subsectors, as
well as industries supplying key inputs into agriculture (Sasol fertilizer
scandal) and food processing (notably bread). The well-justified attention
to collusion and price fixing nevertheless obscures questions of wider
political economy of food; rather, it is located within the neo-classical view
that inequitable market outcomes are the result of ‘distortions’, and so that
the remedy required is one of removing these to bring actors into conformity
with an abstract and idealised market characterised by perfect competition.
This has also been the approach of the Food Price Monitoring Committee
(2003) which, reporting after dramatic rises in the cost of staple foods,
concluded that inflation in foods that peaked at 23 per cent for poor
households had been due in part to hoarding, trader behaviour on the
agricultural futures exchange, and other collusive actions – all of which were
‘imperfections’ which would ‘correct’ themselves. In 1994, Bernstein’s
prophetic (and overly polite) conclusion was that:
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It seems unlikely that competition policy alone with dislodge the
entrenched market concentration of corporate capital in the food
industries. (1994:14)
He has been vindicated. He distinguished two meanings of market regulation,
pointing out that ‘deregulation’ refers to the removal of exogenous public
regulation through law, policy and institutions, while another form of
regulation is endogenous private regulation in a political economy sense,
which is about power and control within the system and how this shapes
opportunities and behaviour. Two years after he wrote, the Agricultural
Marketing Act (47 of 1996) dealt the final blow to the former, dismantling
most of what was left of public regulation through marketing boards, ending
the raft of price controls, marketing quotas and levies, and removing the state
as the key arbiter of agricultural marketing. As a result, concentration not
only of farms but also of associated industry seems to have moved in the
direction he describes as interlocking and vertically integrated industries.
The reasons? First, public deregulation has given way to private re-regulation,
made possible by market dominance; and, second, agricultural policy has
focused on supply-side efficiency rather than demand-side capabilities or
entitlements in support of food security. Sen would not be pleased.
Social grants
In contrast, social grants represent one way in which there has been targeted
intervention to support food security, and with very substantial reach.
These transfers have been crucial in temporarily backing up food entitlements
– with which to buy food that is (mostly) industrially farmed, and is stored,
transported, processed, and retailed by a concentrated and shrinking
number of market actors. In these ways, the transformative potential of this
injection of purchasing power into marginal rural economies – to drive
accumulation ‘from below’ by stimulating rural production – has therefore
been stunted.
A litany of land questions
Gcabashe and Mabin’s itemisation of dimensions of the ‘land debate’ sets
out tensions that were evident in 1990; reflecting on these, one is struck by
the degree to which, just over 20 years later, many remain unresolved.
• Large or small farms? The authors advance the standard World Bank
view that, in the absence of subsidies, large farms will not make it –
because there is an inverse size-productivity relationship in agriculture.
This was based on neo-classical assumptions about the nature of markets,
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and in South Africa has turned out to be wholly wrong – in part because
of the nature of markets, but also because of the failure of the state to take
any measure to promote subdivision of farms, even where these are
redistributed through land reform – a remarkable failure that demonstrates
the tenacity of the ideological attachment to large-scale models of
agriculture in the minds of agricultural officials. The result is that a land
reform programme intended to create a class of smallholders has not
altered the structure of landholding, even while to a very modest degree,
changing the owners. Meanwhile, the re-regulation Bernstein predicted
has spurred concentration in ownership, a trend wholly antithetical to
land reform: the number of commercial farming units dropped from about
60,000 in 1996 to 45,000 by 2002 and by 2009 to just under 40,000 (NDA
2010). There are now eight agribusinesses involved in this agro-food
system with a turnover above R1 billion a year.
• Ownership or tenancy? Land reform has attempted to address competing
interests in land – notably between claimants and tenants – through
separate legal and policy frameworks. These have conflicted on the
ground, especially in northern KwaZulu-Natal and Mpumalanga – the
sites of the emergence of the Landless People’s Movement, consisting
initially of tenants demanding tenure upgrading and resisting both
threats of eviction and loss of grazing but also restoration of ownership
to former owners through restitution. More generally, policy has had no
adequate answer to these different positionalities. The White Paper on
South African Land Policy of 1997, and the RDP before it, fudged the key
question of who should benefit from land reform and so what transformation
of social relations was being pursued, by presenting long and
undifferentiated and overlapping lists of target groups: the rural poor,
emerging farmers, farm workers, labour tenants, women, youth. The later
removal in 2001 of a means test for access to land reform grants finally
ended any pretence of pro-poor targeting.
• State delivery or people-driven development? Gcabashe and Mabin
(1990) note the tendency on the left to want a new democratic state to
‘deliver’ (and perhaps quite unrealistic expectations of the institutional
strength of a new government to do so) versus a popular, people-driven
process, more in tune with the mass democratic politics of the time. This
tension has endured up to and beyond the National Land Summit of 2005
which called for a people-driven, state-supported land reform. In rejecting
the willing buyer, willing seller approach with its reliance on land markets,
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social movements and NGOs called for the state to play a more central role,
and indeed it has done so, by acquiring and holding land itself, through
a Proactive Land Acquisition Strategy. But, in the absence of any method
for consultation or participatory planning at local level, state purchase of
land has run ahead of any clear notion of who the land is being acquired
for, with the result that caretakers have had to be employed to maintain
farms while the state searches for appropriate ‘beneficiaries’ to which it
can lease these properties. Indeed, this is a state delivering, but it is far
from ‘people-driven’.
• Traditional or freehold tenure?  With titling, the communal areas have
gone, uncertainly, full circle: from an approach of recognising de facto
rights (proposed in the 1990s and shelved by Thoko Didiza in 1999); to
privatising the communal areas by transferring title to ‘traditional
communities’, thereby shoring up the powers of chiefs, apparently as part
of a deal between the ANC and the amaKhosi brokered on the eve of the
first local government elections of 2000; and then the overthrow in 2010
by the Constitutional Court of the Communal Land Rights Act (11 of 2004)
which embodied this model. The Act was struck down as unconstitutional
after the High Court had found that, among other flaws, the Act violated
the right to gender equality, and failed to meet the requirements of Section
25(7) of the Bill of Rights to security of tenure for those whose tenure was
rendered insecure as a result of racially discriminatory laws and practices.
In short, privatising communal land through title, to be controlled by
tribal authorities augmented by a few elected members, would not wish
away the fundamental insecurity of tenure experienced by people living
in communal areas.
• Farm dwellers: The predicted expansion of labour tenancy was misread,
the key reason being the introduction of laws intended to secure the
tenure rights of farm workers and dwellers, including particularly the Land
Reform (Labour Tenants) Act (3 of 1996) and the Extension of Security of
Tenure Act (63 of 1997) – which are under threat now of being diluted
through their proposed replacement by the euphemistically titled Land
Tenure Security Bill of 2010. This Bill shifts the focus from securing tenure
on farms to removing farm dwellers to agrivillages where they may be
provided with low-cost housing and basic services on municipally
controlled land while remaining available as labour for surrounding farms
– but without any personal connection or ability to make use of land on
farms where some have lived for generations. This is a model that makes
more sense in the labour-intensive and more proletarianised horticultural
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– fruit and wine – sector of, for instance, the Western Cape, than it does
elsewhere in the country. The Bill repeats almost to perfection the basic
tenets of the AgriSA land reform policy of 2000: avoid the expansion of
settlement in the farming (read: former RSA) areas; concentrate the
settlement of workers off-farm; make tenure contingent on employment
so as to avoid people being entitled to remain on farms where their labour
is not longer required, or across generations; and finally, aim to transfer
responsibility for some of the social costs of reproduction of a rural labour
force to the state.
I disagree with Alan Mabin’s reflection that the core reason for the failure
of land reform in South Africa is that it flies in the face of a global inexorable
logic, of primitive accumulation and urbanisation – essentially of agrarian
transition. One of the basic problems with land redistribution has been the
tendency towards what Jeremy Cronin has called ‘representative
redistribution’: where attempts to move towards parity between groups
overrides questions of class and economic structure, locality and specificity.
In the quest for hectares, for percentage targets, and in the interests of
tapping into growing public funds for market-based acquisition of land for
private use, class has been almost wholly elided in the current policy
approach to land reform in South Africa. I agree with Alan that the purpose
of land reform must be rethought and this must be about geography and
space that have new social meanings; and with Henry that this rethinking
must be about not only land but restructured commodity chains – the
agrofood system.
Reflections
In my view, these papers raise three enduring questions which are still of
relevance – perhaps even more so now, given the window of opportunity
that has been in large part missed to challenge societal norms around the
distribution, tenure regime, and land use system.
First, how to confront agrarian dualism? Gcabashe and Mabin asked in
1990 what the end of apartheid would mean for the Bantustans; we still don’t
know. Now less of a labour reservoir to subsidise capital accumulation in the
cities, as argued by Wolpe (1972), they continue to provide a base, however
economically tenuous, for those who have migrated, temporarily or
permanently (if that distinction is real) to towns and cities. The decline of
wage remittances and the rise of social grants in these economies have done
little to alter the structural problem: not the degree to which but the way in
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which they are integrated into urban industrialised South Africa. The
Bantustans have been dismantled, institutionally and politically, but is the
economic structure unchanged? Not quite, rather the shift has been from a
remittance to a social transfer economy. Meanwhile, there have been few
inroads into the commercial farming areas. The long-term exigency to stop
the ‘beswarting van die platteland’ that informed policy through most of the
twentieth century endured into the democratic era, with farmers and policy
makers reminding themselves and others of the need to avoid the
‘Bantustanisation’ of the former ‘RSA’ – with all the associations of
unproductive land use and unplanned settlement that the term has come to
imply.
Second, how to confront inequality, and the growing social differentiation
in rural areas? This is not merely the unfortunate byproduct of economic
growth, but a core assumption underpinning policy. The flagship Massive
Food Production Programme in the Eastern Cape, like the FSPs before, aims
to create a small-to-middle commercial farmer class through state subsidy
and private credit, conglomeration of contiguous fields, chemical and capital
intensive production. Marginalisation of other producers is a necessary part
of this process of development. What these transformations mean for farm
employment in the communal areas, and whether some process of
dispossession and proletarianisation is underway, has not really been
explored – perhaps a blind spot that falls outside our dualistic thinking. Yet
obscuring social differentiation has endured in policy thinking, at the same
time that it has up to now in fact been highly dualistic, with many rural
development interventions – in land and agriculture – being based on a
bifurcation of provisions which, on the one hand support household food
production (welfare) for the poor, or a subset of them, through start-up
packages, school and community gardens, and empowerment or ‘ladders-
up’ into the ‘first economy’ for the few with the evident potential to invest
in and succeed in commercial production.
Third, how to confront the contradictions between agricultural and land
policy? Bernstein was writing after the report of the World Bank mission
which proposed agricultural deregulation combined with market-based land
reform; when Gcabashe and Mabin were writing, this mission had not yet
been conceived – except possibly in the mind of Bank economist Hans
Binswanger who, in his own words, had a mission to save South Africa from
itself. The tensions are still being felt between these dual frameworks.
Agricultural policy saw the dismantling of the (public) regulatory architecture
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in agriculture that could have been reoriented towards a new clientele: a class
of accumulating black petty commodity producers. This explains in part the
failure of redistribution of land to translate into improved livelihoods and
new patterns of production and social relations, let alone create a new
dynamic class of successful smallholders. Although the two departments
responsible for agriculture and land were joined in one ministry with the end
of the Government of National Unity in 1996, their policies remained
fundamentally at odds with one another. The introduction of a pro-commercial
farmer from 2000 onwards under Mbeki and Didiza was more in tune with the
liberalising logic of the new agrarian path – but itself was held hostage to
the very limited public support for land use, and led to the patterns of
indebtedness reminiscent of the DBSA’s experiments with FSPs in the
Bantustans in the 1980s.
With the benefit of hindsight I would add a perspective on a trend not fully
evident in the early 1990s: the regionalisation and globalisation of the
agrarian question. Discussion of the papers in this special issue of
Transformation was held in old sugar-cane country on the KwaZulu-Natal
north coast. This was Hulett land, later part of Tongaat-Hulett, which is now
producing in six southern African countries, having acquired large
concessions and leases to communal land and to former state farms.
Producing in and exporting from Mozambique, for instance, enables Tongaat-
Hulett to take advantage of advantageous terms for tariff-free importation
of sugar from less developed countries into the European Union. Its major
business in South Africa now appears to be property development along this
coastline (KwaZulu-Natal), a far more profitable business than growing
cane; and, getting in on this lucrative action is British Sugar, which now
owns 50 per cent of Tongaat-Hulett. This is just one example of a much wider
phenomenon of large-scale acquisition by South African companies in the
region; as of 2010, commercial farmers organised under Agri South Africa
were in negotiation with 22 African countries for allocations of land on long-
term leases (AgriSA 2010). The regionalisation extends of course well
beyond primary production to processing, distribution and retail; suddenly
South Africa is not so ‘exceptional’.
To my mind, this is emblematic of one way in which ‘the agrarian question’
has shifted since the early 1990s: it is not to be understood at a national level.
Increasingly, the land is local; the labour is regional; and the capital is
globalised. Prescriptions, then, for land and agrarian reforms in South Africa
ought to be rethought and recast in this wider frame.
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